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A. I. Introduction 
 
 When federal agents exhibit conduct that violates the United 
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that those agents 
should be held civilly liable for their actions, as shown by its 
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.3 Applicable constitutional violations include 
those which infringe on any individuals’ constitutional rights. This 
includes violations of the constitutional rights of noncitizens. 
Although the Supreme Court disfavors expansion of Bivens claims 
and has only extended this remedy twice, in Davis v. Passman and 
Carlson v. Green, the Ninth Circuit Court recently approved such 
expansion in a cross-border shooting case, Rodriguez v. Swartz. That 
decision created a circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 
which is especially relevant as those Circuits include two-thirds of 
the courts along the United States border with Mexico. The decision 
of whether to extend Bivens remedies requires a careful analysis 
involving sensitive issues relevant to each case; in this case, most 
notably, foreign affairs, national security, and extraterritorial 
matters. When used appropriately, interpretations like the Ninth 
Circuit’s allow constitutional integrity to be upheld and prevent 
qualified immunity of government officials from being 
overzealously applied.  
 
1 This case note was written before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. (2020), which also explores a Bivens action in a 
cross-border shooting. 
2 Associate Member, Immigration and Human Rights Law Review 
3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 
(2d Cir.1972) 
        






 Shortly before midnight on October 10, 2012 a United States 
Border Patrol agent shot an unarmed, sixteen-year-old boy walking 
down the street in Mexico.4 The agent, Lonnie Swartz, was on duty 
on the American side of the border with Mexico when he spotted the 
young boy, José Antonio Elena Rodriguez (hereafter “J.A.”), 
walking alone down the Calle Internacional, a street in Nogales, 
Mexico that runs parallel to the border.5 From his high vantage point 
atop a rock wall that was 25 feet higher than the road J.A. was 
walking on, Swartz fired between 14 and 30 bullets through a steel 
beam fence at J.A. Ten of those bullets hit J.A., mainly in the back, 
and killed him instantly.6 
Prior to the shooting, J.A. was walking peacefully down the 
Calle Internacional, unarmed and showing no signs of violence, 
aggression, or any other threatening behavior against anyone or 
anything. He was shot by Swartz without warning or provocation, 
despite posing no threat to Swartz or anyone else.7 It was unknown 
to Swartz at the time of the shooting whether J.A. was armed, 
whether he had ever visited the United States, and whether he had 
any connections to the United States.8  
Furthermore, the street J.A. was walking on separates 
Nogales, Arizona, from Nogales, Mexico, is the main thoroughfare 
of that area, and is lined with many commercial and residential 
buildings.9 Families live on both sides of the border and it is 
common for people to cross from one side to the other for various 
reasons.10 In fact, at the time of the shooting J.A.'s grandparents 
lived on the American side of the border in Arizona as lawful United 
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States permanent residents and often crossed into Mexico to visit 
J.A. and his family.11 Although J.A. had never been to the United 
States, Swartz could not have known this at the time of the 
shooting.12 In actuality, Swartz did not even know whether J.A. was 
an American or Mexican citizen when he shot him across the 
border.13 
 
III. Procedural Posture 
 
 Acting both individually and as a personal representative of 
J.A.’s estate, Araceli Rodriguez, J.A.’s mother, brought suit against 
Swartz in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 
for money damages.14 Suing under a Bivens cause of action, which 
allows civil suits to be brought following constitutional rights 
violations, Rodriguez alleged that J.A.’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated by Swartz when he killed J.A. 
without any justification.15 Although Swartz conceded that 
Rodriguez had a Bivens cause of action under the Fourth 
Amendment, he moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified 
immunity.16 The district court denied Swartz’ claim of qualified 
immunity and dismissed Rodriguez’ Fifth Amendment claim, 
treating the shooting as a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.17  
 In response, Swartz filed an appeal in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the district 
court’s denial of qualified immunity and the allowance of a Bivens 






14 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d 719 at 727. 
15 Id. 
16 Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages so 
long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 728. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
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IV. Background Discussion 
 
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics 
 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment provides a basis for a federal cause of action for 
damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.19 
Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the Court held that violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
by federal agents acting under color of their authority gives rise to 
causes of action for damages consequent to the unconstitutional 
conduct.20  
On November 26, 1965, Webster Bivens’ apartment was 
searched by six federal agents without a search or arrest warrant, in 
an unreasonable manner.21 Bivens was arrested and put in manacles 
in front of his wife and children, who were also threatened with 
arrest, while the entire house was thoroughly searched.22 Further, 
subsequent to the search, Bivens was arrested for violating narcotics 
laws and booked at the Federal Narcotic Bureau.23 During this 
ordeal, Bivens was also interrogated by the agents and subjected to 
a visual strip search.24 Although the complaint against Bivens was 
ultimately dismissed, he stated that the nature of his search and 
arrest caused him “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental 
suffering.”25   
 
19 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 389 (1971). 
20 Id. 
21 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 
F.2d 718, 719 (2nd Cir. 1969). 
22 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389. 
23 Bivens, 409 F.2d 718 at 719. 
24 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389. 
25 Bivens, 409 F.2d 718 at 719. 
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As a result of this, Bivens brought suit against the agents, 
seeking damages for the unlawful search and seizure.26 The district 
court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1331, and alternatively for failure to state a claim on which relief 
could be granted.27 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
found that the district court did in fact have jurisdiction under §1331, 
relying on the decision in Bell v. Hood.28 In Bell, the Supreme Court 
held that district courts have jurisdiction to determine whether 
Fourth Amendment complaints state sufficient federal causes of 
action.29 Despite this finding, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision to dismiss the claim for failure to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted, and held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not authorize private suits for damages caused by 
unreasonable search and seizures brought under §1331 federal 
question jurisdiction.30 
On appeal in the Supreme Court, the question previously 
reserved by the Court in Bell regarding whether violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights by federal agents gives rise to causes of action 
for damages was considered.31 In its opinion, the Supreme Court 
highlighted the power inequalities between citizens and federal 
agents as a reason for reaching this decision.32 An agent acting under 
the power of the United States has a far greater capacity for harm 
than an individual, which is why the Fourth Amendment operates as 
a limitation upon the exercise of federal power.33 When that 
authorized power is abused, the courts must be able to adjust their 
remedies to grant the necessary relief.34 As the Court explained, 
damages have historically been regarded as the ordinary remedy for 
invasions of personal interests in liberty, so it should be unsurprising 
 
26 Id. 




31 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389. 
32 Id. at 391. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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that damages may be obtained for injuries resulting from 
constitutional rights violations.35  
Thus, the Supreme Court held that constitutional violations 
do give rise to civil causes of action for damages and that in Bivens’ 
case his embarrassment and mental suffering, as well as the agents’ 
lack of probable cause, constituted such a violation.36 As a result, 
Bivens was entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he 
suffered as a result of the violations from each agent.37  
 
B. Ziglar v. Abbasi  
 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, the 
implied cause of action theory adopted in that case was again 
considered by the Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi.38 In Ziglar, the Court 
considered whether to allow an action for money damages in the 
absence of congressional authorization in regard to detention policy 
and prison abuse claims.39  
 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, hundreds of 
undocumented immigrants were taken into custody and held by 
order of the United States Government.40 Although some of these 
detentions were based on well-grounded suspicions, many others 
were likely based on fear of Arabs and Muslims.41 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation      (hereinafter “FBI”) questioned more than 
1,000 people with suspected links to the September 11 attacks, 
resulting in the arrest and detention of more than 700 individuals on 
immigration charges.42 Although, if a detainee was designated as not 
being “of interest” to the investigation, they were processed 
according to normal procedures; if they were designated as “of 
 
35 Id. at 395. 
36 Id. at 399. 
37 Id.       
38 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2017). 
39 Id. at 1869. 
40 Id. at 1851. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1852. 
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interest” to the investigation, they were subject to a “hold-until-
cleared policy” and held without bail.43  
Many of these detainees were held for weeks or even months 
at a time under harsh conditions while agents tried to determine 
whether they were connected to the terrorism.44 According to the 
complaint, detainees were held in “tiny cells for over 23 hours a day” 
with the lights left on 24 hours a day.45 They were not afforded 
sufficient opportunities to exercise or participate in recreation, were 
denied access to even basic hygiene products such as soap and 
toothbrushes, and were shackled and escorted by four guards 
whenever they were removed from their cells.46 In addition, they 
were not allowed to communicate with the outside world, were 
frequently strip-searched, and subjected to “physical and verbal 
abuse” from many of the prison guards.47  
As a result, six of these detainees later filed suit for 
compensatory and punitive damages alleging Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment constitutional violations on their own behalf and on 
behalf of a putative class.48 Three high executive officers in the 
Department of Justice and two of the detainees’ facility wardens 
were named as defendants in the complaint.49 Although the District 
Court dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and 
ruled that the complaint was sufficient for the action to proceed 
against the officials.50  
When considering whether the officials could be sued for 
damages under a Bivens remedy, the Court discussed the interpretive 
framework under which there was a possibility that “the Court 
would keep expanding Bivens until it became the substantial 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1851. 





50 Id. at 1854. 
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equivalent of 42 U.S.C. §1983.”51 However, the Court also 
recognized that in cases following Bivens it cautioned that where 
Congress “intends private litigants to have a cause of action,” the 
“far better course” is for Congress to confer that remedy in explicit 
terms.52 Therefore, the Court highlighted that when deciding 
whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the “determinative” 
question is one of statutory intent.53 If Congress intended to create 
the private right of action asserted, then a cause of action may be 
recognized; however, absent such intent, recognizing an implied 
cause of action is inappropriate.54  
As such, the Court made clear that expanding the Bivens 
remedy is now a “disfavored” judicial activity with separation-of-
powers principles being central to the analysis, asking the question 
whether it should be up to Congress or the courts to decide whether 
to provide for a damages remedy.55 Based on the Court’s precedents, 
a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are “special factors 
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress.”56 Although the Court has not defined specific special 
factors, the inference is that any factor that would cause a court to 
hesitate before answering in the affirmative is such a factor.57 
Further, the existence of alternative remedies usually precludes a 
court from authorizing a Bivens action.58  
Because the Court of Appeals failed to analyze the prisoner 
abuse claims regarding the presence of special factors counseling 
hesitation, the Supreme Court remanded to allow the Court of 
Appeals to consider the claim in light of such a determination.59 
However, in regard to the detention policy claims the Court held that 
 
51 Id. at 1855. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1856. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1857. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1858. 
58 Id. at 1864. 
59 Id. at 1869. 
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an action for money damages was not allowed and the Bivens 
remedy should not be extended.60  
 
C. Hernandez v. Mesa  
 
 In Hernandez v. Mesa, the United States Supreme Court 
returned an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
following a ruling from the Supreme Court that the issue of whether 
federal courts have the authority to craft implied damages actions 
for alleged constitutional violations needed to be more carefully 
considered.61 After such considerations, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the transnational aspect of the particular facts of the case presented 
a new context under a Bivens cause of action, but that numerous 
special factors were counseling against federal court interference 
under a balance of powers analysis.62  
 As the facts in the complaint alleged, Sergio Hernandez, a 
15-year-old boy, was shot and killed by Agent Mesa on June 7, 
2010.63 Hernandez was a Mexican citizen without family in or any 
other ties to the United States.64 He was playing on the Mexican side 
of the border, in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, while Agent Mesa was 
stationed on the United States side of the border, in El Paso, Texas.65 
While engaging in his law enforcement duties, Agent Mesa noticed 
a group of young men throwing rocks at him from the Mexican side 
of the border.66 In response, Agent Mesa fired several shots toward 
the assailants and fatally wounded Hernandez in the process.67 
 Following the death of their son, Hernandez’s parents 
brought suit in federal court against Agent Mesa, alleging, among 
other things, a Bivens cause of action under the Fourth and Fifth 
 
60 Id.   
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Amendments.68 Although the federal district court dismissed all 
claims, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and allowed the 
Bivens claim to proceed.69 However, upon rehearing the appeal en 
banc, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the claim failed because Agent 
Mesa was shielded by qualified immunity from any claim under the 
Fifth Amendment.70 On appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court 
remanded and ordered the Fifth Circuit to reconsider allowing 
Bivens claims to proceed on behalf of the Hernandez family in light 
of the Court’s decision in Abbasi, in which it remanded for 
reconsideration by the appeals court as to whether a Bivens claim 
could be maintained against a prison warden.71  
 In regard to possible alternative remedies, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that because there is no 
federal statute authorizing damage actions by foreign citizens by 
federal law enforcement officers under these circumstances, the 
plaintiffs’ only possible recovery of damages exists if the federal 
courts approve a Bivens implied cause of action.72 However, before 
approving an implied cause of action under Abbasi, the court first 
had to determine whether the circumstances of the case presented a 
“new context” for Bivens claims, and then, if so, whether the 
circumstances presented any “special factors counseling hesitation” 
against implying damage claims against an individual federal 
officer.73  
In determining whether there was a new context in a 
particular case, the court stated that the relevant inquiry is whether 
“the case is different in a meaningful way” from prior Bivens 
cases.74 This means that a case deriving from an unconstitutional 





71 Id. at 815. 
72 Id.   
73 Id.   
74 Id. at 816. 
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extension is still an extension.75 Because Hernandez was a Mexican 
citizen shot on Mexican soil and there has been no judicial guidance 
concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution as it applies 
to foreign citizens on foreign soil, the court held that the facts 
presented a new context for a Bivens claim.76  
Moving on to the special factors analysis, the court 
considered whether allowing a Bivens action to proceed based upon 
a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim would present any special 
factors counseling hesitation.77 In making this determination, the 
court explained that the presence of any special factors precludes a 
Bivens extension.78 Focusing its inquiry on maintaining the 
separation of powers, the court found several special factors 
presented by the facts of the case.79  
As one of the special factors, the court highlighted the threat 
to national security implicated by the involvement of the Border 
Patrol, as that is the prerogative of Congress and the President.80 The 
court worried that permitting Bivens liability could undermine the 
Border Patrol’s ability to perform national security duties by causing 
agents to “hesitate in making split second decisions” in the future.81 
The court also discussed the possible negative impact on foreign 
affairs and diplomacy in a broader sense that could be caused if a 
Bivens cause of action were allowed.82 Finally, the court touched on 
Congress’ failure to provide damages as a remedy in these 
circumstances and the extraterritorial nature of the claims as 
additional special factors counseling hesitation, considering 
Congress’ silence as relevant and telling.83  
Because the presence of any special factor counseling 
hesitation precludes a Bivens remedy, and several were enunciated 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 817. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 818. 
79 Id.   
80 Id. at 819. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 820. 
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in its opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
and decided against extending Bivens to apply to the case.84  
 
V. Ninth Circuit Decision in Rodriguez v. Swartz 
 
 Swartz filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the district court’s denial of 
qualified immunity and the Bivens cause of action brought by 
Rodriguez.85 In deciding whether to let Rodriguez’s Fourth 
Amendment claim proceed, the court considered whether qualified 
immunity was applicable considering the circumstances of the case, 
whether the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable 
force to “seize” a person applied in the case, and whether the Bivens 
cause of action could and should be extended in response to the 
case.86 Because the court determined that qualified immunity was 
applicable, J.A.’s Fourth Amendment right was violated, and the 
Bivens cause of action could and should be extended, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to let Rodriguez’s 
Fourth Amendment claim proceed.87  
 
B. Qualified Immunity  
 
The Ninth Circuit court first looked at whether Swartz was 
entitled to qualified immunity because he was on duty as a United 
States Border Patrol agent at the time of the shooting.88 Qualified 
immunity protects public officials, such as federal agents, from 
liability for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established constitutional rights which a “reasonable person” 
would have known.89 Therefore, in making this determination the 
court considered two main questions: (1) whether the officer’s 
 
84 Id. at 823. 
85 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d 719 at 728. 
86 Id. at 728-748. 
87 Id. at 728. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right 
was clearly established at the time of the incident.90 A constitutional 
right is considered “clearly established” at the time of an incident if 
every reasonable officer would have understood that what he or she 
was doing violated that right.91 The court held that no reasonable 
officer could have thought that they could kill J.A. without 
justification based on the facts at hand, so it found that J.A.’s Fourth 
Amendment right was both violated and clearly established at the 
time of the incident, and therefore that Swartz lacked qualified 
immunity.92 
 
C. Fourth Amendment Rights 
 
As part of its qualified immunity analysis the Ninth Circuit 
court also considered whether Fourth Amendment rights applied to 
J.A. as a Mexican citizen, and whether those rights were violated 
when Swartz shot him.93 The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution prohibits law enforcement officers from using 
“objectively unreasonable” force to “seize” a person.94 Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, the court 
determined that the “reasonableness” of Swartz’s use of force 
should be based on the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene at the time of the incident, in order to avoid causing hindsight 
bias.95 
The court also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tennessee v. Garner, which held that even when a felony suspect 
tries to escape, where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the 
officer or others, the harm from failing to apprehend the suspect 








96 Id. at 729. 
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court determined that any reasonable law enforcement officer 
should know not to shoot to kill unless the suspect presents an 
immediate threat to the officer or others or their escape will result in 
a serious threat of injury to others.97 Because J.A. presented no 
immediate threat, or any threat at all, to Swartz or others, and further 
was not even suspected of any crime let alone a felony, the use of 
deadly force was not justified and could not have been considered 
justified by any reasonable officer on the scene at the time.98 
Therefore, the court held that Swartz did not have to determine how 
much force to use to be considered “reasonable,” as he was not 
permitted to use any force whatsoever against someone innocently 
walking down the street in Mexico.99  
However, despite this clear finding of unreasonable force by 
Swartz, the circuit court also had to consider Swartz’ argument that 
he did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not apply to 
the search and seizure of a non-citizen’s property that was located 
abroad, as held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.100 As J.A. 
was a Mexican citizen who was shot, and thus “seized,” in Mexico, 
the court had to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied 
under those conditions.101 Although J.A. was a Mexican citizen shot 
on Mexican soil, the court found that those factors were not 
dispositive to a finding against Fourth Amendment protection 
because neither citizenship nor voluntary submission to American 
law is a prerequisite for constitutional rights.102  
Instead, the court distinguished this case from Verdugo-
Urquidez in that Swartz acted on American instead of Mexican soil 
and therefore was controlled by American law, and unlike the agents 
in that case, did not know whether J.A. was an American citizen or 




99 Id. at 734. 
100 Id. at 729.   
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 731. 
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regarding regulating conduct on Mexican soil were not relevant in 
this case because rather than searches and seizures conducted on 
Mexican soil, this case concerned the use of deadly force against a 
Mexican citizen on American soil.104 For those reasons, the court 
held that there were no practical reasons to caution against extending 
Fourth Amendment protection to include innocent people shot by 
American officers. It further found that J.A. had a Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from the objectively unreasonable use 
of force by an American agent acting on American soil, despite his 
status as a Mexican citizen and the fact that he was shot on Mexican 
soil.105 
 
D. Extending the Bivens Remedy  
 
After determining that Swartz did not have qualified 
immunity and J.A. had a Fourth Amendment right to freedom from 
unreasonable force, the Ninth Circuit court next turned to the 
question of whether Bivens could and should be extended to allow 
Rodriguez to sue for money damages.106 The Supreme Court in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal 
agents gave rise to a cause of action for money damages after Bivens 
was arrested and his home was searched by federal agents without 
probable cause or a search warrant.107 In that case the Court held 
that Bivens was entitled to sue the agents for money damages 
because: (1) there were no “special factors” counseling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) because 
damages were the “only possible remedy” for Bivens.108  
The Bivens remedy has been extended by the Supreme Court 
in subsequent cases to include other causes of action as well, such 




106 Id. at 734. 
107 Id. at 735. 
108 Id. at 736. 
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in Davis v. Passman and inadequate medical attention in prisons in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment in Carlson v. Green.109 The 
Court has explained that Bivens actions are desirable deterrents 
against abusive federal employees by allowing plaintiffs to sue 
agents directly for certain constitutional violations.110 Although 
Bivens remedies are not appropriate in every situation or for every 
constitutional violation and courts should therefore exercise caution 
in determining whether to extend Bivens, in cases where a new 
context that is meaningfully different from previous Bivens cases 
decided by the Supreme Court is presented such extension is 
proper.111  
As such, in determining whether a Bivens remedy should be 
extended in this case, the Ninth Circuit court looked at whether there 
were any special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress, whether money damages were the 
only possible remedy, and whether this represented a new context 
that is meaningfully different from previous Bivens cases decided 
by the Supreme Court.112 Turning first to the latter requirement, the 
court decided that this case presented a new Bivens context that was 
meaningfully different from previous cases.113 Although, like 
Bivens, this case involved a federal law enforcement officer 
violating the Fourth Amendment, unlike Bivens the remedy would 
be applied to an alien who was killed outside of the United States.114 
Thus, this difference is adequate to represent a new context 
justifying extension.115  
 
a. Adequate Alternative Remedies 
 
 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 737. 
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Even though the court decided that the Bivens remedy could 
be extended in this case because it represented a new context, in 
order for an extension to be appropriate there must also be a finding 
of no other adequate remedy and no special factors counseling 
hesitation.116 Focusing next on the alternative adequate remedy 
requirement, the court determined that Rodriguez had no other 
adequate remedies and therefore that that requirement was 
satisfied.117 Although Swartz argued that Rodriguez had satisfactory 
alternative remedies in the form of tort claims, restitution, and 
through the Mexican judicial system, the court disagreed.118  
Because the United States has sovereign immunity under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (hereafter “FTCA”), it cannot be sued 
without its consent, specifically for claims “arising in a foreign 
country,” as they do here.119 Therefore, since J.A. was shot while in 
Mexico, the United States cannot be sued under a tort claim for 
J.A.’s deadly injury under the FTCA.120 However, this does not 
preclude a Bivens remedy because it arises under United States 
constitutional law, rather than Mexican law, and does not implicate 
the application of substantive foreign law, which was what Congress 
sought to avoid by the FTCA foreign country exception.121 
Additionally, under a Bivens cause of action, agents can be sued 
individually and held accountable for his or her own actions, while 
under the FCTA the United States is held liable for agents’ actions 
when they were acting as a federal agent within the scope of their 
employment at the time of the incident.122 However, there is an 
exception under the FCTA that allows Bivens claims to proceed 
against individuals when a civil action is brought against an 
employee of the Government for a violation of the Constitution of 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 739. 
118 Id. at 739-743. 
119 Id. at 739. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 740. 
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the United States.123 Because this case involves the violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, it is a proper context for a Bivens remedy in 
order to prevent Swartz from dodging liability from his own 
constitutional violations by imposing it onto the government.124  
Further, the court also held that Rodriguez has no adequate 
alternative remedy under a state law tort claim against Swartz.125 
Disagreeing with the United States’ suggestion that Rodriguez could 
sue Swartz for wrongful death under Arizona tort law, the court 
explained that such a claim would be barred by the Westfall Act, 
which accords federal employees absolute immunity from common 
law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of 
their official duties.126 Because Swartz shot J.A. while on duty as a 
Border Patrol agent on the United States side of the fence, it must 
be assumed that he acted within the scope of his employment.127 
Therefore, even though he violated clearly established rules 
regulating employee conduct, Rodriguez cannot sue him in a state 
law tort action without converting it into an FTCA suit against the 
United States, and the foreign country exception would bar an 
FTCA suit because the injury occurred in Mexico.128  
Additionally, restitution was also held by the court not to be 
an adequate alternative justifying precluding extending a Bivens 
remedy.129 Even though Swartz was indicted and tried by the United 
States for the murder of J.A., and acquitted of murder by a jury, 
which could have led      to Swartz being required to pay restitution 
to J.A.’s estate if he had been convicted, this is still not an adequate 
alternative remedy for various reasons.130 One reason is that a 
criminal charge is the government’s remedy, not the victim’s, as it 
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reason is that the preponderance of evidence of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt required in criminal cases is higher than that 
required by Bivens claims, which only require a jury to find that it 
was more likely than not that the agent used unreasonable force.132 
This means that even if acquitted of his criminal charges, Swartz 
could still be liable for money damages under a Bivens remedy.133 
Because of this disparity, the court held that the potential restitution 
that could result from a murder conviction was not a sufficient 
alternate remedy to justify preventing Rodriguez’ Bivens claim from 
proceeding.134 
Finally, because Swartz did not provide an adequate 
argument suggesting that Rodriguez would be able to bring a claim 
in the Mexican judicial system, the court also held that there was no 
adequate alternative remedy in that regard.135 Because Swartz 
provided no alternative remedies, the court next turned to a 
determination of whether any factors counseling hesitation would 
justify preventing a Bivens claim from being brought by 
Rodriguez.136 
b. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation 
 
Although the Ninth Circuit court determined that Rodriguez’ 
only available adequate remedy was a Bivens action, it still could 
not extend Bivens unless no “special factors” counseled hesitation 
against doing so.137 In making this determination the court looked at 
highly case specific factors such as governmental policies, national 
security, foreign policy and extraterritorial remedies, rather than 
those at cross-border shootings at an abstract level.138 In regard to 
governmental policies, the court held that because Rodriguez did not 
challenge any governmental policies, and Swartz did not follow any 
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governmental policies, there was no special factor counseling 
hesitation in that regard.139 A special factor is present when a 
plaintiff challenges high-level executive branch policies because a 
Bivens claim is not a proper vehicle for altering the entity’s policy, 
but that is not the case here.140 Rodriguez did not sue a policy-
making official, but rather an officer, and federal regulations 
expressly prohibited Swartz’s conduct in using deadly force under 
the circumstances.141 Therefore, because this case involved 
“standard law enforcement operations” and “individual instances of 
law enforcement overreach” rather than governmental policies or 
policymakers, a Bivens remedy is still applicable.142 
Next, the court looked at whether extending Bivens would 
implicate national security, which would be a special factor 
counseling hesitation.143 Although the court considered the concerns 
highlighted in Ziglar v. Abbasi, in which the Court held that there 
were national security concerns because the plaintiffs in that case 
challenged the government’s response to September 11 and how 
best to protect the United States, it also cautioned against not using 
national security concerns to “ward off inconvenient claims.”144 
While national security concerns are implicated with Border Patrol 
agents as they protect the United States from unlawful entries and 
terrorist threats, it is not reasonable to suggest that part of national 
security involves shooting innocent people walking down the street 
in Mexico.145 In addition, the court claimed that holding Swartz 
liable for his constitutional violation would not deter other Border 
Patrol agents from performing their duties, because the conduct 
exhibited by Swartz was not typical of the conduct generally 
required, expected, and accepted of Border Patrol agents.146 
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Therefore, the court held that national security was not a special 
factor applicable in this case, and did not justify precluding 
Rodriguez’ Bivens claim.147 
The court also looked at whether any problematic foreign 
policy implications could be caused by extending Bivens in this 
case.148 Although, as argued by the United States, the nature of 
cross-border shootings implicates foreign policy, the court 
determined that in this case a Bivens application would not 
undermine any American foreign policy.149 The court found that 
there is no American foreign policy endorsing shootings like the one 
presented here involving a Border Patrol agent shooting an innocent 
Mexican citizen.150 In fact, as the court explained, if a Bivens cause 
of action was not extended international relations between America 
and Mexico would likely be threatened, because it would allow 
Swartz to escape civil liability for his unreasonable use of deadly 
force.151 Therefore, no special factor in regard to foreign policy 
counseled hesitation against allowing Rodriguez to bring a Bivens 
claim.152 
Finally, the court considered whether any presumption that 
would constitute a special factor against extraterritorial remedies 
had been rebutted.153 Although the court did not disagree with the 
dissent’s suggestion that the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of statutes suggested an analogous presumption against 
extraterrestrial Bivens claims, it still found that the presumption 
could be overcome because actions touching and concerning the 
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption existed.154 Because Swartz was acting within his 
capacity as a United States Border Patrol agent and shot J.A. from 
 
147 Id. 





153 Id. at 747. 
154 Id. 
        
   
22 
 
his location on American soil, his actions touched and concerned the 
territory of the United States.155 Further, the United States’ interest 
in regulating the conduct of government officials on American soil 
was reflected by its willingness to apply criminal law 
extraterritorially when it charged Swartz with murder.156 Because 
this interest in deterring unconstitutional misconduct of officers is 
sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterrestrial 
Bivens claims, the court held that there was no special factor 
counseling hesitation in that respect and Rodriguez’ claim was not 
barred.157  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit court decided that Swartz was 
not entitled to qualified immunity in this case, the Fourth 
Amendment was applicable, and the Bivens remedy could be 
extended due to the inadequacy of other alternative remedies and the 




In his dissent, Justice Smith’s main disagreement with the 
majority opinion is that it oversteps separation of powers principles 
and that its determination of a lack of special factors counseling 
hesitation against extending Bivens is inaccurate.159 He also argues 
that the majority places undue significance on insufficient 
alternative remedies, as only the presence of one is relevant as it 
precludes a Bivens expansion.160 In regard to separation of powers, 
Justice Smith argues that the majority oversteps by deciding on the 
issue of whether to provide a damages remedy when such a question 
should be answered by Congress.161 His opinion states that the 
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border context, especially in light of the case presenting a new 
Bivens context, which he claims the majority downplays in its 
analysis.162 He disagrees with the majority primarily because 
previous Bivens remedies have not involved extraterritorial 
components or national security implications.163  
Additionally, Justice Smith also finds that the majority 
overlooked several special factors counseling hesitation.164 
Focusing on the Supreme Court’s determination that “the inquiry 
must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent 
congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs 
and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed,” he argues 
that the implication of foreign relations, border security, Congress’ 
failure to provide a damages remedy, and the cross-border nature of 
the case are all special factors.165 Because only one special factor is 
necessary to preclude Bivens claims proceeding, Justice Smith 
argued against the majority’s opinion to allow the claim and agreed 




 The Ninth Circuit Court’s decision in Rodriguez following 
the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Hernandez created a circuit 
split that has yet to be resolved. This is especially problematic as it 
means that two of the three Mexican-United States border touching 
federal circuit courts are split, which has significant negative 
implications for border-related issues. Although both cases 
recognize that the relevant circumstances present a new Bivens 
context, they disagree over the existence of any special factors 
counseling hesitation against extending a Bivens cause of action, and 
the importance of the presence, or lack thereof, of alternative 
remedies. Both cases have similar facts, involving cross-border 
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shootings of Mexican citizens by United States Border Patrol 
Agents, and implicate particular issues relevant to such 
circumstances. Nevertheless, in Hernandez the court decided not to 
extend a Bivens remedy and held that the agent was entitled to 
qualified immunity, while in Rodriguez the court disagreed and held 
that qualified immunity did not apply and allowed a Bivens remedy. 
 
A. New Bivens Context 
 
 Both the Fifth Circuit court in Hernandez and the Ninth 
Circuit Court in Rodriguez agreed that these circumstances would 
represent a new Bivens context, although they disagreed on the 
impact of that determination on allowing such a cause of action to 
proceed. While the Fifth Circuit found creating a new context to be 
a factor weighing against allowing a Bivens cause of the action, the 
Ninth Circuit merely took it as the first step in its overall analysis. 
Although the Fifth Circuit was correct to exercise some caution in 
allowing a new context as the Supreme Court has stated that doing 
so is judicially disfavored, it is not meant to be a complete bar. When 
necessary and so long as the other requirements are satisfied, Bivens 
is permitted to be extended in order to provide civil remedies to 
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated. 
Therefore, by focusing too much on its concerns about allowing a 
new context in the first place, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis was 
skewed in favor of confirming qualified immunity from the 
beginning, before the rest of the analysis involving special factors 
counseling hesitation and adequate alternative remedies was even 
discussed. 
 In circumstances such as these, where a foreign citizen has 
been shot from across the border by a United States border patrol 
agent without provocation, it is clear that Bivens would have to be 
extended to allow a remedy to go through. Previous Bivens contexts 
approved by the Supreme Court have included constitutional 
violations of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Davis 
v. Passman, and of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment in Carlson v. Green. Although 
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extension happens rarely, that does not mean it should not happen 
when appropriate. Furthermore, in these types of cases, where 
Bivens causes of action are the only remedy of individuals whose 
constitutional rights have been so egregiously violated and no 
special factors counsel hesitation, it is not only appropriate but 
necessary to ensure justice.  
 
B. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation 
 
The disagreement over the existence of special factors 
counseling hesitation represents the main reason for the disparity in 
holdings between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts. The threshold 
for such factors is low, as the presence of even one precludes Bivens 
claims from reaching fruition. However, even though the Fifth 
Circuit enumerated several relevant factors, the Ninth Circuit 
identified none. These alternate conclusions show that this type of 
analysis is dependent on the view from which it is taken and 
significantly influenced by the opinions of those making the 
determination. By focusing on the possibility of potential negative 
outcomes in the abstract, however likely or unlikely, the Fifth 
Circuit was able to identify several possible factors. In contrast, by 
focusing more on the likely outcomes of each case-specific 
component, the Ninth Circuit found no factors counseling hesitation. 
More guidance as to what constitutes “hesitation” and how to go 
about the analysis being provided by the Supreme Court could help 
overcome these disagreements and prevent circuit splits such as the 
one that has occurred here.  
The factors found by the Fifth Circuit to be special and 
counseling hesitation were the impact on foreign affairs, the threat 
to national security, and the extraterritorial nature of the case. In 
regard to foreign affairs, the court worried that allowing civil 
liability could cause a negative impact on foreign affairs by creating 
tension between the American and Mexican governments. However, 
the same could also be true for not allowing civil liability. The 
killing of unarmed Mexican citizens across the border by United 
States government agents, especially the killing of children who did 
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nothing to provoke those agents, is a highly sensitive and 
complicated issue. In such cases those individuals have the 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and not 
providing the families of those individuals the ability to access civil 
remedies in response to those violations is far more concerning than 
any inevitable tension that may result from the litigation in the first 
place. Although foreign affairs implications are certainly a major 
consideration in the Bivens analysis, under these circumstances the 
potential negative impacts of not allowing civil litigation to proceed 
are more like a special factor counseling hesitation against denying 
a Bivens extension. 
Moving next to national security considerations, the Fifth 
Circuit again argued that allowing a Bivens extension in these types 
of cases could have a negative impact, this time on the national 
security of the United States. Specifically, the court worried that 
allowing a Bivens remedy could cause border patrol agents to 
hesitate when making split second decisions in the future and 
therefore undermine their ability to perform their duties. What that 
court failed to consider, however, was that imparting increased 
hesitation on border patrol agents in the future may in fact be a good 
thing. When there are multiple instances of border patrol agents 
shooting innocent people, innocent children, without hesitation, that 
suggests that split second decisions can cause agents to overreact 
and end lives for no legally or morally sufficient reason. Such 
actions obviously constitute an infringement on justice and 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, punishing agents who react in 
this way would only have an impact on agents who are acting 
unreasonably, because only those who act unreasonably lose the 
protection of qualified immunity in the first place. Holding agents 
accountable for their unreasonable actions would not undermine the 
effectiveness of those agents who act appropriately, and actually 
may improve the overall success of national security by creating 
increased caution and awareness in border patrol agents in general. 
The Ninth Circuit was therefore sound in its reasoning that this 
factor, although highly relevant, is not one counseling hesitation 
against allowing a Bivens cause of action. 
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit also highlighted the extraterritorial 
nature of the claims as a special factor counseling hesitation. 
Although in the abstract this may seem to be logical, looking more 
narrowly at the specific facts of the case shows that the contrary 
opinion may also be reached. The previous factors of foreign affairs 
and national security overlap with this factor, so it makes sense that 
a court that found that those factors counseled hesitation would find 
the same for this factor as well, while a court that reached the 
opposite conclusion would again disagree. By looking at the specific 
facts of these cases, wherein innocent Mexican children were shot 
from across the border by United States Border Patrol agents, a court 
could actually find that not allowing civil liability is what really 
counsels hesitation. Although the cross-border nature of these 
claims caused increased complications and tensions between both 
governments, that alone is not dispositive to preclude Bivens claims. 
Because even foreign citizens residing in foreign countries have 
constitutional protections under these circumstances, they should 
not be denied the possibility of obtaining civil remedies for such 
heinous violations merely because they were on the opposite side of 
the border.  
 
C. Alternative Remedies 
 
Although both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts agreed that 
in these cases the affected individuals had no other adequate 
remedies, the Fifth Circuit did not find this to be very impactful on 
the overall Bivens analysis, while the Ninth Circuit made it a focus. 
The unequal weight given to this component suggests that additional 
clarification by the Supreme Court on the importance of a lack of 
adequate alternative remedies would be helpful going forward. The 
Fifth Circuit seems to suggest that Congress’ failure to provide a 
damages remedy in these circumstances is telling, and therefore that 
a lack of adequate alternative remedies does not necessitate allowing 
the creation of a new Bivens context. The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, discussed the lack of alternative remedies such as tort claims, 
restitution, and the Mexican court system at length in its opinion, 
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ultimately concluding that the lack not only allowed the analysis to 
proceed to the determination of special factors counseling 
hesitation, but that it weighed in favor of extending a Bivens remedy. 
Although having clear damages remedies provided by 
Congress in these circumstances would be extremely helpful for 
determining when qualified immunity may be overcome, the lack of 
such clarity does not mean qualified immunity must therefore 
always be permitted. That would negate the purpose of the Supreme 
Court allowing Bivens claims from the outset. Instead, the presence, 
or lack thereof, of alternative remedies should be treated as one 
factor in the overall analysis. In this case, as enunciated by the Ninth 
Circuit, there are not adequate alternative remedies other than 
through a Bivens cause of action. This means that the only civil 
remedy the mothers of these children who were killed by United 
States border patrol agents have is to pursue such a claim. The only 
way that justice can be upheld, and the agents held civilly 
accountable is for the courts to take this lack of alternative remedies 
significantly into consideration when deciding whether to extend 
Bivens and defeat qualified immunity. 
 
D. Overall Effect of Extending Bivens  
 
All of these individual components must be considered when 
determining whether or not to extend Bivens. Although doing so is 
indeed considered a judicially disfavored action that must be treated 
with caution, too much caution could alternatively frustrate the 
original purpose of preventing the infringement by government 
officials on individuals’ constitutional rights. Additionally, if the 
Fifth Circuit Court’s determination that special factors counseling 
hesitation exist is correct, a negative impact could occur in regard to 
foreign affairs, national security, and extraterritorial matters. And in 
the abstract, that may seem to be the case. However, from a case-
specific point of view, the opposite realization becomes relevant as 
well. If the United States fails to allow these individuals to seek civil 
liability and overcome qualified immunity in light of the lack of 
adequate alternative remedies and special factors counseling 
        
   
29 
 
hesitation, that could cause even worse and farther-reaching 




 These are complicated issues and analyses that are by no 
means meant to be taken lightly. Without further guidance from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts will likely continue to struggle with 
these types of situations and come to different opinions regarding 
the appropriate decisions. However, until that guidance is provided, 
it is important that courts strive to find the delicate balance between 
not overturning qualified immunity overzealously, but also not 
allowing it to obstruct judicious outcomes. Although both courts in 
this instance came to logical conclusions based on their 
understandings of the Supreme Court’s rulings, the Ninth Circuit 
seems to have reached the most effective, unbiased outcome. 
Precluding Bivens remedies in these cases precludes not just one 
means of overcoming qualified immunity, but all possibilities of 
civil remedy in general. Because of the unreasonable nature of the 
actions committed by the relevant border patrol agents, Bivens 
should be extended so that qualified immunity should not obstruct 
justice and accountability. 
 
 
 
